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Re-Considering State-Society
Dynamics in Turkey’s Kurdish
Southeast
Nicole F. Watts
1 State-society relations in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast have long been characterized as
pitting  a  powerful  and  determined  state  against  a  reluctant,  resistant,  but  largely
overwhelmed population. Such an image of a binary, state versus society relationship is
readily  substantiated  by  a  myriad  historical  and  contemporary  examples:  multiple
Kurdish rebellions against the central state, cultural and political dissent articulated
from poetry to  political  parties,  emergency rule  law in Kurdish-majority provinces,
extrajudicial  killings  condoned  and  organized  by  state  security  forces,  a  series  of
constitutional  court  decisions  to  close  parties  supported  by  at  least  a  third  of  the
region’s electorate, street clashes between protestors and police in Diyarbakır – the list
is  long.  It  was  in  recognition  of  this  (continuing)  history  and  less-than-ideal
relationship between the state and Kurds in the southeast that Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan argued in mid-2009 that it was time to bring ‘freedom and security, in
their  fullest  sense,  to  our  Eastern  and  Southeastern  regions’  and  to  work  towards
creating a new kind of Turkey in which no one felt ‘crushed, excluded, or oppressed’
and ‘no one, absolutely no one, feels like a second-class citizen when dealing with the
state and its institutions’ (Erdoğan 2009). And it was with these points in mind that a
2008 Turkish think tank report on the southeast enjoined: ‘The State should remember
that, at the very least, it owes an apology to society in general, and to Kurdish people in
particular’ (TESEV 2008: 36).
2 This special issue offers a kind of ‘Yes, but...’ response to these characterizations. It is
not  our  intent  to  minimize  them or  belie  their  authenticity  but  to  take them as  a
contextual framework that, while pointing to persistent structures and dynamics that
have indeed set the fundamental rules of the game, nonetheless only tell parts of the
story,  and do not capture all  possible moves and countermoves taken by the many
different  players  involved.  Yes,  state  policies  in  the  southeast  and  towards  the
Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
1
country’s ethnic Kurds have been -- and still are -- driven in large part by a security
imperative  that  has  legitimated  the  security  establishment’s  control  over  policy
making and rationalized a wide array of coercive mechanisms. Top-down models of
social engineering and the provider-logic of father state have and do still  dominate
conceptualizations of appropriate interventions in the southeast. Nonetheless, rather
than take these experiences and narratives as the end point of analysis we here use
them as our point of departure. 
3 In this vein, this issue seeks to re-assess state-society relations in the southeast in two
main  ways.  First,  we  reconsider  standard  conceptual  assumptions,  emphasizing  in
particular the need for nuanced approaches that do not take either the Turkish state or
Kurdish society as unitary and treat the relationships between them as variable rather
than stable. The ‘southeast’ has indeed been constructed through war, discourse, and
imagination as a kind of zone of exceptionality, resistance, and contestation, but it is
not immune to the same gritty dynamics of real-life state-society relations that exist
almost  everywhere:  an  incoherent  and  often-divided  state  that  usually  lacks  the
resources to execute policies effectively; social groups that co-opt local officials and
penetrate state institutions in various ways; blurred boundaries between public and
private that complicate the idea of a state space distinct from a social one; all sorts of
non-hostile and in fact mutually beneficial relations that form on all sides; resistances
that  not  only  undermine  state  authority  on  many  different  levels  but  sometimes
reproduce its  power.  Moreover,  state-society relations in the southeast,  just  like  in
other places, are dynamic and changeable.
4 Second,  then,  more  specifically,  we  reconsider  state-society  relations  in  the  region
since 1999 in the context of the significant political changes that have occurred in the
last ten years. Rather than assuming a permanent ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005;
also see Öktem 2006) or a static, binary relationship with fixed players, then, this issue
emphasizes historical specificity and calls for an open recognition of the variability of
authority,  accommodation,  and protest  through time and across space,  as  well  as  a
willingness  to  explore  and  interrogate  a  state-society  boundary  that  has  been
simultaneously effective and over-stated. 
5 In keeping with these themes, this essay is divided into four main parts. Part I examines
some of the ways state and society in the southeast have typically been depicted in both
popular and academic scholarship. Building on eclectic body of state-society relations
scholarship, Part II offers some alternative fundamentals for a more nuanced way of
studying state-society relations in the southeast. Part III offers some thoughts on why
and how state-society relations in the southeast became ‘exceptional’ in the 1980s and
1990s, in the sense that they differed fundamentally from other parts of Turkey, and
Part  IV  examines  the  degree  to  which  we  can  evaluate  the  post-1999  period  as
constituting a new phase of state-society relations in the region. 
 
I. Traditional depictions of state-society relations in
the southeast
6 Both popular and scholarly narratives of state-society relations in the southeast have
tended  to  depict  the  state  as  a  well-coordinated  entity  that,  beginning  with  the
establishment of the republic in 1923, imposed itself with varying degrees of success on
the Kurdish population of the southeast, applying force to suits its aims but ignoring
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the well-being of ordinary people. A classic rendition of this perspective can be found
in  the  following  passage  from  Kurdish  activist  and  author  Musa  Anter’s  famous
memoir, Hatıralarım. Anter writes:
The villagers used to take wood to Mardin to sell. They transported it by donkey.
They would sell the firewood for about 50-60 kuruş. If the donkey and the saddle
were in good condition, they could sell it for 5-6 lira. To make the donkey go while
riding it, Kurds say 'ço'. Poor Kurds who didn’t know Turkish and who didn’t know
anything about this would say 'ço,' and the gendarmes would stop them and beat
them up for speaking Kurdish. When the Kurd – speaking Kurdish -- tried to defend
himself against this, they would prosecute him and charge him with a crime. 
Something like  this  happened to  one of  my mother’s  relatives.  His  donkey and
firewood were confiscated and sold (to pay the fine). He received 5 Turkish lira for
them, but his fine was 12 lira. So he was jailed for two days and beaten up. Three
and a half months later when the tax collectors came to our village, they wanted
him to pay the remaining seven lira outstanding on the fine and said that if  he
didn’t pay, they would seize his house and belongings. Of course the gendarmes
came along with the tax collectors. My uncle was able to pay the fine by selling a
few of his sheep. This incident didn’t just happen to my uncle, it was commonplace.
If there was a documentary archive of crimes in Mardin you would find a great
many of this sort of disgraceful document (Anter 1991: 29).
7 In  Anter’s  narrative,  relations  between  state  and  Kurdish  society  are  emphatically
negative and oppositional; binary (interactions occur directly between state authorities
and  Kurdish  villagers,  who  each  play  clearly  delineated  roles);  and  hierarchical
(authorities punish villagers, who seem almost helpless here to stop them). The state is
depicted as almost omniscient; restrictions on the use of Kurdish are not just issued
from a central office in Ankara but are applied at the local level by multiple sets of state
representatives  who,  somewhat  remarkably,  possess  sufficient  capacity  to  track  his
uncle’s  failure  to  pay  the  full  fine  from  one  set  of  institutional representatives
(gendarmes) to another (tax collectors). 
8 Anter’s portrayal – given dark substance by the author’s murder at the hands of state-
sponsored death squads at  a  Diyarbakır  fair  in  1992 --  has  long been reiterated by
activists,  academics,  journalists,  and  other  commentators,  as  Güneş  Murat  Tezcur
discusses  extensively  in  his  contribution  to  this  issue.  Relying,  as  he  argues,  on
dichotomies between ethnic and civic nationalism and/or between state and society,
many  analysts  and  observers  have  reinforced  the  idea  of  the  state  as  a  unitary
‘overlord’  state  (Robins  1993)  with  essentially  unchanging  (i.e.  adversarial)  policies
towards Kurds, especially in the southeast. Kurds themselves tend to be portrayed as
falling  into  two  main  groups:  ordinary  people,  who  are  variously  ignored  and
repressed, and ‘traditional’ Kurdish landed and tribal elites, who are portrayed as co-
opted and, sometimes, thus less than fully Kurdish (McDowall 1997: 400). The ‘natural’
Kurdish response to Turkish rule is assumed to be resistance and protest, something
seen  as  prevented  only  through  heavy  levels  of  state  pressure  --  thus  we  read
repeatedly of ‘Kurdish re-awakenings’ and ‘rebirth’ at times of increased mobilization
(see e.g. White 2000: 13-131). 
9 Some points are worth noting here. First, it is important to emphasize that there has
been  a  great  deal  of  sensitive  scholarship  on  Kurdish  politics  in  Turkey  that
complicates the binary, state-versus-society model, even if indirectly (see e.g. work by
Belge; Bozarslan; Somer; Yeğen, Kirişci and Winrow, Dorronsoro), indeed sometimes by
the same scholars otherwise faulted for perpetuating a binary model (e.g. McDowall
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1997,  whose  masterwork certainly  teases  out  many of  the  ambiguities  of  state  and
society that might fall by the way in some of his generalizations). So the dominance of
the  state-versus-society paradigm  is  not  because  we  entirely  lack  alternative
information  or  because  we  don’t  know  better.  I  elsewhere  elaborate  (Watts
forthcoming-a) on the various empirical, theoretical, and methodological reasons for
the durability of this paradigm, but it is worth briefly stating that probably the most
important reason the model continues is because there is so much empirical evidence
to support and perpetuate it.  The military’s identification of Kurdish ‘separatism’ --
very broadly defined -- as one of the most serious threats to the security of the state
helped justify two military interventions (1971 and 1980) in civilian politics, excluded
civilian officials from having any serious input into policymaking on the Kurdish issue,
and contributed  to  the  construction and perpetuation of  a  repressive  juridical  and
security regime that criminalized many types of contention and identified particular
‘identities of resistance’ as internal enemies, thus stripping challengers of their rights
as citizens and implicitly (if not explicitly) justifying their persecution (see e.g. Cizre
2003, 2008). Although there have been divergences, confrontations, and deviations, the
security  imperative  and  the  security  apparatus  has  been  allowed  to  dominate
policymaking.  The  closure  of  the  pro-Kurdish  Democratic  Society  Party  (DTP)  in
December 2009, the detention of many pro-Kurdish mayors and activists, and ensuing
clashes between protestors and police in cities such as Diyarbakır certainly conveys the
impression of an exhaustive and repetitive cycle of conflict, of a relationship of near-
permanent opposition. 
10 Nonetheless,  it  is  clear  that  the  state-versus-society  paradigm formulates  a  narrow
reading of Kurdish-state relations in the southeast and disregards or sidesteps many
other  important  questions  and  developments.  Working  with  a  binary  model,  for
instance, it is hard to understand why so many Kurds in Turkey have not rebelled, how
and why the nature of Turkish governance in the southeast has changed over time (for
example, it  differed substantially before the 1980 military coup and after),  why and
how Kurdish cultures and dissent survived and changed; and why so many Kurds vote
for  mainstream  Turkish  or  Islamic  parties.  This  last  point  and  many  others  are
developed by Tezcür in his contribution here. 
11 Moreover,  ironically,  while  the  binary  state-versus-society/oppressor-and-victim
model  has  dominated  our  thinking,  there  is  also  an  implicit  and  (less  commonly)
explicit appreciation for the fact that in some ways Turkish authorities clearly failed to
achieve  their  goals.  Without  minimizing  the  enormous  impact  of  the  centralized
Turkish  state  on  culture  and  politics  in  the  southeast,  it  is  clear  that,  if  as  Joost
Jongerden writes in this issue, state authorities aimed at a ‘homogenous and ubiquitous
representation throughout the territory as everywhere the same, from west to east and
north to south,’ then something went very wrong. 
 
II. Reconceptualizing state-society relations in the
southeast
12 Our re-assessment of state-society relations in the southeast, then, constitutes an effort
to open  doors  onto  some  of  these  complicated  and  fascinating  dynamics.  For  the
contributors  to  this  issue,  it  involves  four  inter-related  tasks.  First,  building  on  a
diverse body of work on state-society relations (e.g. Migdal 1988, 2001; Mitchell 1991;
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Migdal et al 1994; Gupta 1995; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Das and
Poole 2004) we seek to disaggregate the state rather than assuming it to be a unitary
actor. This can be done by studying officials at different levels of governance – Migdal
divides them, for instance (2001: 117-122), into those ‘in the trenches,’ the ‘dispersed
field offices,’ ‘agency’s central offices,’ and ‘commanding heights’ -- and by looking at
different institutions and institutional responses to particular policies or events, for
example, between the judiciary (or parts of it) and the parliament. The value of such an
approach is illustrated in this issue by Senem Aslan’s investigation of the judiciary’s
varied responses to court cases concerning Kurdish names. Without an appreciation for
the fact that, as she documents, the upper courts tended to support the right to give
Kurdish names -- in contrast to lower courts that tended to reject them -- we cannot
really explain how so many people in Turkey come to have (legal) Kurdish names or
why naming has become such a contentious issue. Similarly, Marie Le Ray notes in her
study of legal activism in Tunceli/Dersim how different representatives of the judiciary
have  given  different  decisions  regarding,  for  instance,  the  right  to  hang  Newroz
posters. The explanatory power of the ‘disaggregated state’ is further illustrated in this
issue in Jongerden’s contribution, in which he argues that the failure of the proposed
Village  Return  and  Rehabilitation  Development  Plan—intended  to  create  new
settlements to house villagers forced to leave their homes in the fighting of the 1980s
and 1990s—can be attributed in good part to divergent institutional responses between
the plan’s home institution, the Regional Development Administration of the Southeast
Anatolia Project, and governors and military officials, who preferred to have villagers
living in urban areas where they would be easier to supervise. Resistance by the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the plan sounded its death knell; as Jongerden
writes, the project ‘hit the rocks’ even before the pilot plan was implemented.
13 By applying an anthropology (Migdal 1988, 2001; Das and Poole 2004) or ethnography
(Hansen and Stepputat 2001) of the state that situates state actors within specific social
and political contexts, we gain insight into the kinds of pressures officials face in their
daily negotiations and interactions with different actors. This not only sheds light on
policy  implementation  or  lack  thereof  but  pushes  us  to  explore  the  potential  for
different types of relations between state and social actors, rather than assuming that a
dominant  national  narrative  is  necessarily  relevant.  Officials  trying  to  implement
policy in villages  in the southeast,  for  instance,  face very different  constraints  and
opportunities than those sitting in Ankara. They may be quite capable, as Gupta writes
of a case in India (2001: 65-96), of carrying out one or more functions of stateness – for
instance,  inspection  and  surveillance  --  but  not  implementing  others,  for  instance,
exacting  discipline.  Assuming  states  to  be  ‘messy  until  proven  otherwise’  also
encourages us to problematize coordinated and unitary action. Furthermore breaking
the  state  down  into  constituent  parts  helps  focus  more  precisely  on  studying  the
concrete ways in which the state makes itself appears in ‘everyday and localized forms,’
as Hansen and Stepputat put it (2001: 5), and how the state tries to make itself tangible. 
14 Second, the articles in this issue seek to ‘unpack’ the notion of society by examining
different social responses to governance and statecraft in the southeast. What is very
clear  from  the  collection  of essays  here  is  the  diversity  of  responses  from  local
inhabitants and the need for micro-level studies of their interactions with the state.
The value of such an approach is illustrated in particular by Leila M. Harris’ study of
villagers in Harran. The fact that many villagers welcomed the GAP project, she argues,
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speaks to the ways that substantial state investment can encourage at least some local
communities to recast themselves as ‘subjects of nationalist, statist, and modernization
efforts’ rather than as rebels or victims of the system.
15 While many of Harris’ interviewees were ethnic Arab, it is clear both from her work and
from many of the other studies here that common ethnicity does not necessarily equate
with political preferences or hold equal ‘value’ at all times and for all people. Such a
perspective means challenging Turkish and Kurdish nationalist narratives that portray
Kurds uniformly as a ‘security threat’ or, conversely, as a subjugated and oppressed
population with a natural and universally held desire for independence. Developing a
more nuanced view of social responses and differing interpretations of what Brubaker
(2005) calls ‘groupness’ also involves setting aside the binary categories of oppressor/
victim promoted by human rights activists and other movement organizations. In fact,
as many of the articles in this issue illustrate, Kurdish responses to state policies have
varied dramatically depending on the person, place, and time. Farmers Mufa and Amit
both live in Kurdish villages in Urfa province’s Harran plain, but one views the state’s
GAP project as beneficial, whereas the other sees it as something akin to ‘suicide,’ as
Harris reports. Variations in Kurdish responses to the Turkish national project – and
the socio-political implications of such variations -- are discussed extensively by Tezcür
in  his  contribution here.  As  he  writes,  because  of  the  fact  that  Kurdish  identity  is
‘formed,  articulated,  and  lived  in  many  different  ways,’  this  poses  challenges  for
Kurdish nationalists trying to mobilize large sectors of the population. Problematizing
the  relationship  between ethnicity  and action also  suggests  a  methodological  shift,
Tezcür argues,  calling for  an ‘ethnic-boundary making approach’  to  studying state-
Kurdish relations that draws attention to the strategies and processes that groups use
to try and construct groups by defining boundaries between themselves and others.
16 Third, building on literature in state-society relations as well as in ethnic conflict and
social  movement  theory,  we  seek  to  foreground  the  state-society  dynamic.  This
involves several enterprises. One is to locate the state as an actor competing with other
groups for the right to make rules and norms. The ‘mélange model,’ as Migdal once
termed it (1988), establishes relatively clear identifications of state and societal players,
then examines how and why they work in cooperation and conflict.  When do state
actors gain more influence than social authorities? How and why does this change?
What  sorts  of  accommodations  do  they  reach  with  each  other,  and  how  does  this
happen? In particular, we are interested in how state-society relations in the southeast
have  changed  since  1999,  a  period  marked  by  a  significant  reduction  in  the  PKK’s
military  strength  on  the  ground  in  the  Kurdish  regions  of  the  country;  by  new
international  developments  (Turkey’s  accession to  the  EU,  and the U.S.  and British
invasion of Iraq);  and the civilianization of governance in the southeast.  Do we see
shifts  in  power  relations,  expansions  or  restrictions  of  the  political  field,  and  new
capacities on the part of state and society to maintain or challenge authority? If so, to
what can we attribute this?
17 Another  important  aspect  of  the  state-society  dynamic  is  the  recognition  of  the
mutually transformative process between state and society. Put simply, social groups
and state actors influence, shape, and constrain each other; the impact is not just top
(state) down. This point is emphasized in a number of the articles in this issue. In his
contribution, Jordi Tejel Gorgas argues that opposition between Turkish and Kurdish
nationalism  in  the  1920s  and  1930s  compelled  both  Turkish  and  Kurdish  elites  to
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continually adapt their discourse in contrast to their perceived enemy: as he writes, ‘a
kind  of  mimicry,  in  a  double  sense,  was  established  between  the  ‘dominant’  (the
Turkish state) and the ‘oppressed’ (the Kurdish dissent movement).’ Moving to more
recent  decades,  Senem Aslan’s  study  of  Kurdish  naming cases  shows  how activists’
efforts  to  push  the  envelope  of  Turkish  legal  reforms  elicited  particular  sorts  of
responses  on  the  part  of  local  officials  and  judges,  in  turn  shaping  the  judiciary’s
application of recent legal reforms concerning Kurdish names. Marie Le Ray’s study of
law activism in Tunceli/Dersim shows how activist-lawyers’ strategies and efforts to
engage one authority against another sometimes resulted in verdicts favorable to their
clients.  Marlies  Casier’s  study  highlights  the  pressure  Turkish  human  rights
organizations have put on Turkish authorities both nationally and in terms of their
policies in the southeast, and the way authorities have tried to counter this through the
appropriation  of  human  rights  discourse.  Clémence  Scalbert  Yücel illustrates  how
notions  of  ‘tradition’  and  ‘culture’  were  transformed  through interactions  between
local officials and Kurdish performers of dengbêjî (a style of Kurdish singing), with the
process of institutionalization changing dengbêj song practices. And Joost Jongerden
demonstrates how displaced villagers in the southeast returned to their original homes
despite planning officials’  designs to the contrary, contributing to the failure of the
resettlement project. These cases all underscore James Scott’s attention (1988) to the
way that both ordinary people can empower or undermine state policies and practices,
even  in  contexts  in  which  the  state  appears  to  wield  vastly  more  resources  than
challengers and citizens.
18 An  additional  facet  of  our  examination  of  the  state-society  dynamic  involves
interrogating the distinctions we typically make between who and what constitutes
state and society. As Mitchell wrote almost 20 years ago (1991), an alternative approach
to the state has to begin with the uncertain boundary between state and society. For us
this involves both questioning our standard classifications of who constitutes official,
challenger, and ordinary citizen, as well as spaces and institutions themselves. At what
point can state institutions be treated as sites of social challenge? When do private
spaces such as the home become a public office? How do the conversations about such
people  and  places  change  over  time,  imbuing  them  with  different  meanings?  As  a
number of the articles in this issue note, such blurriness is particularly evident in the
case  of  the  Kurdish-party-controlled  municipalities.  It  is  also  a  factor  complicating
perceptions of the new human rights bodies established in the last five years by the
AKP administration, as Marlies Casier documents in her article here. What becomes
evident in these studies is the fact that such pro-Kurdish and human rights ‘officials’
sometimes  defy  categorization,  alternately  and/or  simultaneously  serving  as  both
movement  entrepreneurs  and  civil  bureaucrats,  and  sometimes  of  more  than  one
‘state-like’  apparatus (i.e both as Turkish state officials and as officials of  a kind of
quasi-Kurdistan).
 
III. The southeast as a space of exception 
19 The southeast discussed in this issue is not a fixed territory with clearly demarcated
borders  but  a  cultural  and  political  construction.  Socially  produced  spaces  are  the
products  of  practices  constituted  through interactions  and multiple  narratives  (see
Harris,  Jongerden  and  Tejel  Gorgas  in  this  issue).  As  Tejel  Gorgas  details,  the
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construction of the east and, later, southeast as a space of exception dates to the early
years of the republic, and while understandings of what is meant by this have changed
over time (see e.g. Yeğen 2004), the ‘east’ or eastern Anatolia has long been understood
as  something  beyond geography,  as,  in  Tejel  Gorgas’  words,  ‘the  location  of  actual
armed  resistance  and  the  representation  of  a  region  intrinsically  conservative  and
counter-revolutionary.’
20 As used here, then, the southeast is distinct from the official Turkish administrative
region of the same name, neglecting some provinces officially classified as southeast
(Kilis,  Gaziantep,  Adıyaman)  and  including  others  technically  part  of  Turkey’s
administrative Eastern region.  We conceptualize them here as  part  of  metaphorical
Kurdish southeast  even if  geographically  they lie  northeast  or  west  (in  the case  of
Tunceli/Dersim) because these provinces have Kurdish populations that were directly
affected  by  the  war  and  emergency  law  rule.  Geographic  designations  are,  then,
ambiguous and inconsistent, very much an artifice given concrete meaning through,
among other  things,  governmentality  and conceptions  of  population.  However,  our
discussion of the southeast writ large should not obscure the fact that those ‘within’
the region tend to act in locally distinctive ways across space and time, and there is no
necessary or usual coordination in action or rhetoric between cities or provinces within
the southeast. Electoral variations between and within provinces and cities are one of
the most obvious indications of this (see e.g. Dorronsoro and Watts 2009; Kirişci 2007). 
 
Creating exceptionality: processes of differentiation in the
southeast 
21 Use of the term southeast is thus not meant here simply as a synonym or stand-in for
‘Kurdish  issue,’  which  can  be  roughly  defined  as  the  question  of  how  the  Turkish
political  establishment resolves  the tension between its  unitary,  Turkish-nationalist
based  political  framework,  on  the  one  hand,  and  collective  Kurdish  mobilization
demanding cultural and political rights including some form of self-determination, on
the other. The Kurdish issue is thus a national question involving the status of Kurdish-
state  relations  throughout  the  country,  and  while  it  incorporates  questions  of
governance in the southeast, it extends beyond this. 
22 Conversely, a discussion of state-society relations in the Kurdish southeast constitutes
an  assertion  that  there  is  something  different  or  exceptional  about  state-society
relations in this region, as distinct from Kurdish-state relations in other parts of the
country.  This  difference  is  not sociologically  innate  or  fixed; neither  ethnicity  nor
social structure (i.e. tribalism) defines the southeast as a distinct sub-space. Rather, a
number  of  factors  and  actors  have  constructed  it  as  such.  Key  aspects  of  this
differentiation  process  include  the  security  regime  in  operation  here  almost
continuously since 1979-1980 and the application of different sets of laws under martial
and then extraordinary rule law (Olağanüstü Hal, or OHAL) that was in effect in most of
the region until the late 1990s and in four provinces until 2002; the activities of the PKK
and its efforts to monopolize the means of coercion and symbolic capital, creating dual
and dueling authorities in parts of the southeast; the different level and nature of party
activities  in  the  Kurdish-majority  provinces  from  the  late  1970s  onward;  differing
regional configurations (with Iraqi  Kurdistan) and international  linkages (i.e.  to the
Kurdish diaspora in Europe) than in other parts of Turkey; and much more restrictive
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control over information as compared to other parts of the country due to both the
PKK and the state. 
 
Characteristics of exceptionality
23 Cumulatively,  these  distinctions  helped  produce  a  particular  kind  of  state-society
relationship in the southeast. First, security institutions dominated the state apparatus
at  the  expense  of  the  conventional  court  system  and  electoral  institutions.
Extraordinary law institutionalized a state-versus-society relationship, and the state to
a large degree lost symbolic authority and the ability to legitimate its rule through non-
physical  means.  The  state’s  relationship  with  ‘society’  in  the  southeast  was,  then,
exceptionally  coercive.  Although the parliament and other branches of  the Turkish
state exerted some limited checks on military power in other parts of Turkey, in the
executive,  regular  parliamentary  renewals  of  OHAL  aligned  security,  executive  and
legislative branches of the state, with the clear preponderance of the first. This legal
‘state  of  exceptionality’  (Agamben  2005;  also  Das  and  Poole  2004)  was  something
recognized  by  the  European Court  of  Human Rights,  for  instance,  when it  stopped
requiring domestic remedy for court cases originating with plaintiffs in the southeast
and instead allowed them to directly petition the court. 
24 Such dominance of the security state did not necessarily mean a uniform application of
policies, as several articles in this issue make clear. For instance, Senem Aslan’s article
shows how even in the 1980s and 1990s, officials applied decisions regarding Kurdish
name cases inconsistently,  even after the Ministry of  the Interior sent out national
circulars stating that officials in registration offices should register names of parents’
choice.  Nevertheless,  as  she  writes,  state  registrars  continued  to  refuse  to  register
Kurdish  names,  the  gendarmerie  searched  for  Kurdish  names  to  inform  legal
authorities, and local public prosecutors occasionally filed suits against parents who
gave their children Kurdish names. 
25 Second, both because of the dominance of the security regime, and because the PKK
sought  to  sever  typical  mediation  channels  between  government  and  people  (for
instance, tribes) and monopolize others (pro-Kurdish political parties), the context of
the 1980s and 1990s created an image of a dense state-society barrier and a high level of
polarization between authorities and local people. Many Kurds in the southeast came to
see the state as highly unrepresentative,  impenetrable,  and fundamentally different
than themselves. This can be thought of as a ‘de-naturalization’ of the state (see e.g.
Hansen and Stepputat 2001) as it took on the image and practice of above and beyond
the  reach  of  ordinary  people,  of  being  disassociated  from society,  and  of  being  an
imposed rather than ‘natural’ feature of daily life. If, as Hansen and Stepputat argue,
one main way the state governs is by acquiring ‘discursive presence and authority to
authorize,’ then the state in the southeast in this time largely lost this authority. And,
indeed, the PKK’s effort not to mediate between citizen and state but replace that state
authority  entirely  contributed  to  a  kind  of  blockage  in  representation  and  the
formulation of social demands and interests within formal political institutions. It is in
this highly polarized context, for instance, that the Turkish Human Rights Association
was formed, as Casier writes in her contribution to this issue, noting that especially in
the  southeast,  the  emerging  human  rights  organizations  ‘came  to  occupy  an  anti-
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authoritarian  space  offering  one  of  the  few  vehicles  through  which  people  could
engage in criticism of the official state ideology and policies.’
26 Somewhat  paradoxically,  however,  in  practice boundaries  between state  and society
were blurred through the security regime and militarization of society because state
policies were not only implemented by officials in uniforms and judicial robes but by
village  guards,  militias,  and  extrajudicial  forces  (Balta  Paker  2009;  also  Dorronsoro
2006).  This  era  saw,  in  other  words,  state  penetration  of  society  in  new  ways.  In
particular, the existence of state-sponsored village guards composed of local Kurdish
tribes and clans, or portions of them, meant that Kurdish ‘society’ was regimenting and
patrolling  ‘itself.’ This  perpetuated  the  sense  that  villages  and  towns  had  been
incorporated into a kind of  detention camp in which,  as  Agamben writes (2005:39),
people ‘moved about in a zone of indistinction between the outside and the inside, the
exception  and  the  rule,  the  licit  and  the  illicit’  and  ‘every  juridical  protection
disappeared.’ The security forces’ penetration of private and social spaces -- the home,
the office, the cultural fair, for instance -- extended threat, coercion, and punishment
into ordinary and private places. The case of Vedat Aydın, a founder of the Diyarbakır
branch of  the  Human Rights  Association  and  the  pro-Kurdish  HEP party’s  regional
branch chairman in Diyarbakır,  is  perhaps one of the earliest and best known such
examples. Aydın was taken from his family and his home late at night by policemen (or
men dressed as police) and found shot dead a few days later on a highway outside
Diyarbakir. No perpetrators were ever identified or prosecuted (Watts forthcoming-b).
This  transformation  of  the  borders  of  the  state  through  the  mechanism  of  the
privatization of enforcement is explored extensively by Marie Le Ray in her discussion
of the law in Tunceli. As she writes, the village guards contributed to making the state
‘less legible’ because they moved across the ‘ divide between legal and extralegal forms
of  enforcement’  and  also  used  this  ‘acquired  right  to  violence  to  settle  local  and
community conflicts’.
27 A  third  characteristic  of  this  period  was  a  new  societal  dualism  in  which  Kurdish
society was simultaneously reproduced as more unified and homogenous (i.e. as people
who are victimized,  repressed,  and distrusted),  and,  at  the same time,  reconfigured
with new fault  lines  and split  into new sorts  of  factions and groupings (i.e.  village
guards, PKK supporters, new urban migrants). The war, OHAL, and forced migration
blurred some of the differences and distinctions that had permeated Kurdish society in
the  southeast  in  earlier  decades,  producing  a  more  unitary  and  more  broadly
nationalized populace in the sense of the construction of a national subject. This was
demonstrated,  for  instance,  through  electoral  results  that  showed  increasingly
consistent  support  for  pro-Kurdish  and Islamic  parties  rather  than secular  Turkish
parties. On the other hand, the 1980s and 1990s also created new social distinctions and
differences, or more accurately, reconfigured old divisions and competitions along new
lines, and with new types of resources (see especially Balta Paker 2009). The 1980s and
1990s also saw the development of new hierarchies of authority, as PKK-supported and
aligned actors and those who benefited economically from the war and the drug trade
moved  into  positions  to  challenge  so-called  traditional  elites  and  those  who  had
dominated the political scene prior to the 1980 coup. 
 
Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
10
IV. Post-exceptionality? State-society relations in the
southeast after 1999
28 Nonetheless, the fact that the southeast has been a kind of space of exception does not
mean this  is  a  permanent status or that  the state-society relationship is  not  under
negotiation.  Collectively,  the articles  in this  issue suggest  at  least  the possibility  of
‘post-exceptionality’  in  state-society  relations  in  the  southeast.  Such  post-
exceptionality  does  not  signal  ‘democratization,’  stability,  or  a  shift  to  something
imagined as ‘normalcy’ (i.e. an alignment with relations in other parts of Turkey) but
indicates  an  environment  in  which  substantial  reconfigurations  in  the  nature  of
authority are taking place, creating a chaotic and tense environment. As Le Ray writes
of Tunceli in her contribution to this issue, ‘The unilateral cease-fire of the PKK in 1999
and the official lifting of the emergency rule in July 2002 did not suddenly turn war into
peace and a state of emergency rule into a binding rule of law on the whole national
territory.’ Rather, post-exceptionality involves a de-stabilization of the Turkish nation-
state project, struggles to create new spaces and alternatives to dominant discourse,
and  new  efforts  at  the  production  and  control  of  knowledge.  It  is  thus  a  highly
contested process involving many levels of challenge, accommodation, and counter-
moves. Moreover, the imprint and influence of both the security state and the PKK are
still  very  much  present,  with  neither  exercising  hegemonic  authority  but  both
nonetheless shaping and circumscribing actors on the ground. 
29 Collectively, the essays in this issue point to several main dynamics of the post-1999
period  that  suggest  a  new,  ‘post-exceptional’  phase  of  state-society  relations.  First,
political authority is redistributed among a wide number of state and non-state actors,
with pro-Kurdish municipalities playing a particularly important role in blurring the
boundary between state and society.  Second,  ‘social’  resistance to state policies has
become increasingly institutionalized, largely taking place within the formal political
arena and legal channels. Third, as in earlier eras, the state-society relationship is again
mediated through third-party players, although such players have been reconfigured
and reconstituted due to the PKK-state war. I briefly discuss each of these dynamics
here in turn. 
 
Hedging hegemony: the crowded field of political authority in the
southeast
30 In the 1980s and 1990s the struggle for physical, juridical, and symbolic control over
land  and  people  in  the  southeast  was  roughly  bi-polar,  between  central  state
institutions and the PKK. In contrast,  in the post-1999 period, central state officials
share authority and governance with multiple sets of actors. State-society relations are
multi-faceted, negotiated on many levels, and involving many different players. These
include parties, municipalities -- in the southeast almost exclusively controlled either
by the Kurdish nationalist parties or the AKP -- non-governmental or civic committees
and  associations  (some  but  not  all  affiliated  with  the  PKK),  and  European  and  EU
institutions and actors,  all  of  whom may be involved in various ways in a range of
governance  projects  ranging  from  local  renovation  projects  and  infrastructural
improvements  to  population  surveys,  health  reforms,  cultural  festivals,  literacy
programs, sociological research on local folkloric traditions, the production of films,
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books, and audio recordings, and more. Put another way, although state authorities
regained physical control over territory in the second half of the 1990s, they began to
cede or lose control over symbolic, informational, and economic capital. 
31 In this issue, articles by Scalbert Yücel, Tezcür, and Jongerden in particular highlight
the important role played by pro-Kurdish dominated municipalities in encroaching on
central  government  authority  and  offering  new  formulations  of state-society
relationships. Pro-Kurdish parties first won local offices in the southeast in 1999 (and
again in 2004 and 2009), and their control over municipalities has blurred the boundary
between state and movement, official and activist, and state and society. As Scalbert
Yücel puts it, pro-Kurdish municipalities are ‘situated in an inbetween space,’ on the
one hand seen as governmental offices staffed by state actors, and, on the other, as part
of the broader Kurdish national movement. Zeynep Gambetti also eloquently discusses
this bifurcation of authority in her work (Gambetti 2008), noting that in Diyarbakir,
people have two oppositional sets of planners and agencies to resist or to enforce their
demands.
32 Such inbetween-ness is evident in many of the activities carried out by pro-Kurdish
mayors and municipalities. On the one hand, many of their endeavors look like routine
languages of governance (Hansen and Stepputat 2001):  the gathering and control of
knowledge  of  the  population,  and  the  generation  of  resources  ensuring  the
reproduction  and well  being  of  the  population.  At  the  same time,  these  seemingly
mundane governance functions have been carried out through the prism of the Kurdish
national movement; thus, for instance, municipal health booklets have been published
in Kurdish under the rationale of better access to the population, and such activities as
the naming of parks and streets take on very high symbolic value (Jongerden in this
issue; also Watts 2006 and forthcoming-b). 
 
The Institutionalization of resistance 
33 Another dynamic evident in the post-1999 period is an increasing tendency towards the
institutionalization of resistance in which challengers use formal institutions of state to
challenge Turkish authorities.  This is a reflection both of pro-Kurdish party control
over  municipalities,  which  gave  activists  new  access  to  material  and  symbolic
resources,  and  to  changing  perceptions  of  state  institutions  --  especially  the  legal
system -- as being accessible in new ways and a potential instrument for promoting
particular interests. 
34 Access to the tools and resources of governmentality and government practices has
facilitated a number of activities that bring contentious social practices and norms into
formal realms of representative government, bridging the state-society relationship in
new ways. As Scalbert Yücel discusses, for instance, dengbêjî -- long discouraged and
then outright prohibited by Turkish officials -- is now an activity licensed by municipal
officials  in  Diyarbakır.  A  ‘deviant’  social  practice  thus  has  become  officialized.
Similarly, local practices of using Kurdish place names even after Turkish authorities
changed and Turkified them (see e.g. Öktem 2008) have been incorporated into a now-
standard  repertoire  of  institutionalized  contentious  action,  as  pro-Kurdish
municipalities seek to reconstruct and Kurdify public space through the naming and
renaming of parks and streets (Jongerden in this issue; Gambetti 2008, Watts 2006). As
Jongerden writes in this issue, ‘the (re)naming strategy of DTP mayors not only directly
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counteracts  past  efforts  to  efface  Kurdishness  from  rural  and  urban  political
geography, but also tries to reintroduce a Kurdish politico-cultural sensitivity into the
public setting of everyday life.’
35 Particularly striking are new civilian efforts to use the court system, a topic examined
by both Le Ray and Aslan in this issue. As Le Ray writes, inhabitants of Tunceli/Dersim
may  on  one  level  consider  the  court  system  an  instrument of  repression  and
domination  but  nonetheless  recognize  that  on  a  practical  level  it  works  in  an
incoherent  way  that  can,  ultimately,  be  exploited  to  their  benefit.  She  notes  that
because people and organizations in Tunceli  know the system is  inconsistent,  ‘they
often refuse to give up when a court dismisses a case or when a verdict goes against
them.’ People also apply to the courts not only to try and redress grievances but as a
site  of  active mobilization.  As  Aslan argues in her contribution here,  the post-2000
period saw Kurdish activists increasingly using Kurdish names and naming cases as a
‘tool for the symbolic creation of Kurdish nationhood,’ applying for approval for many
names that had nationalist connotations and included many letters of the Kurdish Latin
alphabet.
36 The  institutionalization  of  resistance  offers  new  sorts  of  resources  for  challenging
central Turkish authorities, but it can also be seen as reinforcing the authority of the
state  and  legitimating  top-down  policymaking  and  governance.  While  the  Kurdish
national movement aims to challenge Turkish governmentality and, more generally,
the  Turkish  national  basis  of  the  Turkish  state,  it  does  not  challenge  the  idea  of
authority as properly located within traditional state institutions. The DTP’s emphasis
on good governance,  for instance,  reflects modernist  top-down efforts to transform
Kurdish society both along the lines of the civilizing mission and into a new sort of
Kurdish subject. The logic of opposition in the Kurdish southeast is thus, as in many
other places, that of would-be statebuilders, something that affirms and reproduces the
‘state spectacle’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 37). Such reliance on the categories and
master frames provided by the state is hardly new, as Tejel Gorgas’ contribution to the
issue reminds  us:  even in  the  1920s  and 1930s,  for  instance,  Kurdish elites  created
categories that mirrored those of the state (also see Bozarslan 2003). 
37 Similarly,  the  EU-espoused  ethos  of  multi-culturalism,  human  rights,  and
democratization  offers  both  incentives  and  master  frames  and,  at  the  same  time,
imposed  or  self-imposed  limits  on  challengers’  demands.  For  instance,  despite  the
landmark symbolic value of a Turkish-state- approved dengbêj project, Scalbert Yücel
argues that the involvement of the state in the project through the Turkish Ministry of
Culture and Tourism has not substantially modified negotiations between the actors
involved. As she writes, ‘even though there is no longer a ban, auto-censorship is still in
force and the dengbêjs are represented as “innocent relics” who portray the Kurdish
part of the “Anatolian mosaic” promoted by many government officials in the 2000s.’ 
 
Restoration (and reinvention) of intermediaries
38 Third, the articles in this issue highlight the ways that the state-society relationship is
again facilitated through intermediaries, in particular, political parties (DTP and AKP)
and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  non-governmental  organizations,  civic  groups,  new  and
traditional media, and the European Union and associated actors. Instead of a two-way
relationship  between state  and  social  actors,  then,  state-society  relations  can  be
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thought  of  as  a triadic  exchange  between  state  actors,  Kurdish  ‘society,’  and
intermediary political institutions that serve both to integrate Kurds into the polity
and as sites for resistance and dissent (for more on this see Watts forthcoming-a). 
39 State-society relations in the southeast have typically involved ‘third party’ actors who
transform  the  state-society  dynamic  from  a  two-way  relationship  to  a  more
complicated  triadic  exchange  of  cooperation,  cooptation,  bargaining,  and  challenge
(see  e.g.  Bozarslan  1996;  Tejel  Gorgas in  this  issue;  also,  especially,  Belge  2008).
However,  many  such  intermediaries,  particularly  tribes,  lost  some  or  all  of  their
influence  during  the  fighting  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  or  saw  this  influence  re-
formulated in the context of the PKK-state war. In the post-1999 period, pro-Kurdish
political parties, the AKP, and a network of Kurdist associations and non-government
organizations serve in most parts of the southeast as liaisons between state institutions
and ordinary people. While only some of these actors are aligned with the PKK, all are
forced  to  position  themselves  vis-à-vis  the  PKK  and  the  state,  and  their  work  is
conducted through the prism of the region’s experiences of war. The complexities of
such positioning are particularly striking in the case of human rights organizations, as
Casier’s article here makes clear, as well as parties, as Tezcür discusses. For instance, he
argues,  the  PKK’s  decision to  return to  arms in  2004 becomes understandable  only
when one analyzes how the PKK’s control over its Kurdish constituency was threatened
by the rising appeal of the AKP in the wake of the EU-induced reform process. ‘It was
not a coincidence,’ he writes, ‘that the PKK remobilized its armed forces few months
after the March 2004 local elections when the AKP won in many Kurdish provinces.’
 
Conclusion
40 Collectively, the articles in this issue draw attention to a number of important points
that  complicate  typical  conceptions  of  state-society  relations  in  the southeast,  and,
more generally, contested borderlands and spaces of exception. First, we find that in
some ways state-society relations in the southeast are and have been like such relations
elsewhere; they are not so exceptional as to be beyond the scope of analysis. In the
Kurdish southeast, like elsewhere, the state has often operated in an incoherent and
inconsistent fashion; social reactions have been mixed; and both elites and ordinary
people have influenced officials,  policies,  and practices in important ways. This was
true even in the 1920s and 1930s, and in the late 1980s and 1990s under emergency law
rule.
41 Second, at the same time, state-society relations in the southeast have indeed been
strikingly different in particular ways, not because of anything innate to the region but
because both authorities and challengers have made them such. Especially since 1980
state-society relations in the southeast were ‘exceptional’ in the sense that they were
structured by different rules and practices than those in other parts of Turkey and
were marked by the predominance of coercive methods of rule, lack of representation
and accountability, and the security establishment’s penetration of Kurdish society. 
42 Third,  we  find  that  in  the  post-1999  period  important  changes  in  the  nature  of
governance and authority can be seen in many parts of the southeast. Many different
players now compete for and wield symbolic, informational, and material resources.
Pro-Kurdish municipalities have played an especially important role here in offering
new conceptualizations of representation and blurring the boundary between state and
Re-Considering State-Society Dynamics in Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 | 2009
14
society as well as official and challenger. Many of the articles here also point to an
institutionalization  of  resistance  that  has  accompanied  legal  reforms  and  changing
perceptions  of  authority.  This  moment  can  be  characterized  as  a  phase  of  post-
exceptionality in which public institutions and public space have become sites for the
reinterpretation of the citizen-state relationship in the southeast. However, the nature
of this reinterpretation means that the distinctiveness of the southeast in terms of its
particularity is not necessarily being eroded but may even be being institutionalized. 
43 It is in this context of contested post-exceptionality that the December 2009 closure of
the pro-Kurdish DTP,  detention of  dozens of  pro-Kurdish mayors and activists,  and
waves  of  street  protest  can  be  interpreted.  For  some  activists  and  disheartened
observers, these events -- made all the more striking given that they came after almost
half a year of AKP-led discussion of a Kurdish reform package and ‘democratic opening
--  seemed  to  indicate  a  return  to  the  state  of  exception  and  a  renewal  of  an
unadulterated state-versus-society relationship between citizen and authorities in the
southeast. They certainly reinforced the idea that whatever various politicians might
say  or  even  do,  Turkish  policies  in  the  southeast  would  continue  to  be  driven  by
traditional security imperatives enforced through mechanisms of physical and juridical
coercion. 
44 At the same time, the closure of yet another pro-Kurdish party and the subsequent
detentions  and  protests cannot  erase  the  very  substantial  transformations  in  the
nature of  authority and representation that have taken place on the ground in the
southeast in first decade of the 21st century. What the events do highlight, however, is
the  uncertain  and  tension-fraught  experience  of  ‘re-naturalizing’  the  state.  It  is
possible to see the post-1999 phase of post-exceptionality as the start of a process in
which state authority – now shared,  if  uncomfortably,  by central  Turkish and local
Kurdist actors -- began to seem again a ‘natural’ feature of people’s mental and physical
landscape. If so, the December 2009 clashes between activists and Turkish authorities
highlight the challenges of this process, as well as the tenuousness of the public self-
performance of the ‘state in transformation’ perpetuated by both the AKP officialdom
and pro-Kurdish party leaders.
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